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ABSTRACT
The merger of Fleet and BankBoston in September 1999 resulted in a regional New England lending
market in which only one large, universal bank remained. We explore the extent to which that
merger resulted in monopoly rents for the combined entity in some niches within the regional loan
market. For small- and medium-sized middle-market borrowers, prior to the merger, Fleet and
BankBoston charged unusually low loan interest rates, reflecting their ability to realize economies
of scope and scale. After the merger, those cost savings were no longer passed on to medium-sized
middle-market borrowers, which resulted in an increase in the average interest rate credit spreads
to those borrowers of roughly one percent. Small-sized middle-market borrowers (which continued
to enjoy the advantage of loan market competition from remaining small banks) maintained their low
spreads. Our results suggest that it may be desirable for regulators to consider the concentration in
lending markets in addition to deposit markets when evaluating mergers and structuring appropriate
divestiture requirements.  
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1.  Introduction 
Historically, the structure of the U.S. banking industry was highly fragmented. 
Initially, Supreme Court rulings, restrictions on national banks imposed by the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, and state laws and regulations governing state chartered 
banks limited branching. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and its amendments 
effectively prohibited interstate banking. During the 1980s, most states entered into 
selective interstate banking agreements that gradually allowed interstate banking on a 
limited basis. In 1994, legislation effectively eliminated interstate banking restrictions. 
As a result of these changes, the U.S. banking system has witnessed an accelerated pace 
of consolidation within and across state borders over the past quarter century.  
Proponents of branching and consolidation argued that the removal of such 
restrictions would promote competition and reduce market power stemming from barriers 
to entry (e.g. Flannery 1984, Evanoff and Fortier 1988). Consolidated banks also can 
operate more efficiently through their ability to achieve scale economies associated with 
better portfolio diversification, scale related economies of scope in product delivery, and 
lower costs (e.g. Calomiris 2000, Calomiris and Karceski 2000). For the banking system 
as a whole, an increase in interstate mergers and acquisitions improves average bank 
performance through better “bank manager discipline” and “survival of the fitness” 
effects (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996, Hubbard and Palia 1995).  
On the other hand, opponents of consolidation have been concerned about an 
increase in market concentration in some banking markets as a result of mergers. On the 
deposit side, the potential problem of market power seems to be of little concern, since 
regulators act to ensure continuing post-market competition in the deposit market, and   2 
because all banks (large and small) can effectively compete for customer deposits. The 
Bank Holding Company Act requires that the Federal Reserve Board consider the 
competitive effects of any merger proposal before granting merger and acquisition 
approval. As an operational procedure, the Fed applies the Department of Justice Merger 
Guidelines to measure how such a merger will affect the degree of competition in deposit 
markets. In particular, the Fed considers the change and the level of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index calculated from deposit shares of all banks in a particular local banking 
market as a determinant of level of competition in banking markets. 
Cetorelli 2002 studies some deposit markets that are highly concentrated and 
finds evidence that as few as two or three banks competing in the same market are 
sufficient to create “tough” price competition that would remove monopoly profit. This 
finding is not surprising given that all banks in the market can compete for customer 
deposits, and the ability of consumers to access alternative suppliers by car, bus, subway, 
or the internet. 
The concentration of lenders resulting from bank mergers, however, is not 
emphasized by regulators. The Federal Reserve Board does not extend its anticompetitive 
analysis of a proposed merger to the lending market. Ensuring that there is no excessive 
concentration in deposit markets does not preclude market power in at least some 
segments of the lending market. Theoretical analysis and empirical evidence suggest that 
lending market concentration may be a bigger area of potential concern than deposit 
market concentration.
1 In particular, unlike the deposit market, small banks are unable to 
compete for large loans (because of diversification concerns and loan-to-one-borrower 
                                                 
1 Cetorelli 2001 provides a review of several theoretical and empirical studies for the positive and negative 
effects of competition and concentration in banking markets.    3 
regulatory limits). Thus a highly fragmented deposit market may coincide with a market 
where very few banks are able to provide large loans. 
The effects of loan market concentration (defined here as the absence of a 
sufficient number of local competitors in bank lending) should be heterogeneous across 
different segments of the loan market. Small borrowers can borrow from all banks, 
including local community banks.
2  
Very large borrowers typically operate in many different regions of the country, 
have established track records of creditworthiness with many national or international 
banks, and often have access to capital markets. Money center banks compete for their 
business in a borderless environment. Local loan market concentration should have little 
or no effect on the largest firms’ access to credit. 
Of greatest concern, then, is the effect of loan market concentration on middle-
market borrowers. We hypothesize that adverse-selection and transaction costs
3 can 
constrain middle-market borrowers to a geographic area with a limited number of 
potential suppliers (that is, banks large enough to meet their needs).
4 Thus, middle-
market borrowers are most likely to suffer from allowing monopoly power to be created 
in their local lending market.  
                                                 
2 Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995 find evidence that small firms may even benefit from market 
concentration. Their stylized model demonstrates that monopoly bank can solve adverse selection problem 
suffered by lenders in a competitive lending market when they are faced with a pool of risky but unknown 
borrowers. It may be easier in a highly concentrated lending market for lenders to establish lending 
relationships with relatively less known firms.   
3 Higher transaction costs potentially stem from higher search costs, higher monitoring costs, and higher 
information gathering costs required for lenders to build business expertise in a particular local lending 
market. 
4 Degryse and Ongena 2002 provide a review of theoretical papers that show the importance of distance in 
loan pricing and availability. They also provide empirical evidence in support of that model, using data 
from Belgium banks.   4 
This study measures the effects of loan market concentration on middle-market 
borrowers in the clearest case of a merger that reduced competition among large banks 
within a region – the merger of Fleet and Bank Boston in 1999. We take advantage of the 
unique circumstances associated with this merger. Notwithstanding the branch 
divestitures required by regulators to maintain competition in the deposit market,  
middle-market lending activities in New England became highly concentrated in the 
hands of the combined Fleet-BankBoston entity after the merger.  
For a bank to meet the current and prospective needs of a borrower, it must be of 
sufficient size such that a loan to that borrower would not constitute an imprudently large 
risk relative to the equity capital of the lender. Loans to one borrower are limited both by 
prudence and by regulatory limits on loans to one borrower relative to bank equity. Thus, 
there tends to be a correlation between the size of the lender and the size of the borrower 
(as demonstrated in Table I below). 
Virtually no other bank with the ability to supply loans of significant size was 
operating in New England alongside Fleet-BankBoston. Figure I shows the commercial 
and industrial middle-market lending market shares of the twelve largest Bank Holding 
Companies located in New England immediately before the merger. Fleet and Bank 
Boston controlled more than 50% of the pre-merger market share.   
To measure the effects of the merger on loan pricing for middle-market 
borrowers, we compare all-in-spreads of loans made by Fleet and BankBoston to those of 
loans made by other lenders to middle-market borrowers located inside and outside of 
New England for the period before and after the merger using both regression analysis 
and matched-sample comparison methods. We organize the paper as follows. The next   5 
section describes our theoretical framework for modeling the relationship between loan 
pricing and borrower size. Section 3 describes data sources and outlines the research 
methods used in the paper. Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Conclusions and 
policy implications are discussed in Section 5. 
 
2.  Borrower Size and Interest Rates on Loans 
Why should the size of a middle market borrower affect the interest rate paid by 
the borrower? For very small loans, transaction costs of processing loans favor larger 
borrowers, but this would not have any discernible impact on interest rates over the size 
range of loans relevant in middle market lending. 
Borrower size effects, however, proxy for three potentially important influences: 
(1) economies of borrower size that reflect economies of scope, (2) diseconomies of 
borrower size that reflect information costs, and (3) the competitiveness of pricing, which 
varies with size in a non-monotonic fashion, depending on local market circumstances. 
Borrower Size and Economies of Scope 
Economies of scope refer to relationship cost savings that come from selling more 
than one product to the same customer. Providing multiple products to the same customer 
economizes on the costs of marketing, reduces the physical costs per product of 
managing the customer relationship, and economizes on the costs of monitoring 
customers (by avoiding duplicative monitoring).  
Larger firms have more complex needs and typically require more services from 
their bank. For example, larger firms are more likely to be engaged in exporting, and 
therefore, may desire to establish accounts abroad or hedge foreign exchange risk. Larger   6 
firms may decide to have their bank manage their 401-K plan. Larger firms are more 
likely to enter the public equity market and to use their bank to underwrite securities. 
Because large firm size is correlated with more product needs, economies of scope will 
reduce the cost of servicing loans to larger firms, ceteris paribus. 
Borrower Size and Information Cost 
The information cost literature (reviewed by Degryse and Ongena 2002) shows 
the importance of locational proximity for reducing information costs in lending. If a 
bank’s offices are located in one city or region, but a borrower is located partly or 
entirely outside of that region, the bank will face higher information costs when 
undertaking due diligence prior to making the loan and when monitoring borrower 
condition and actions after the loan is made.  
Borrower size is positively correlated with the geographic scope of the borrower 
(i.e., bigger firms will tend to be located in a larger geographic area). Thus, for a bank 
with offices confined to one region, larger borrower size will proxy for higher 
information costs. It is also possible that larger borrower size raises information costs 
even for banks located throughout the geographic range of the borrower, since larger 
firms, which on average have more diverse locations and types of operations, may be 
more complex, and therefore, harder to monitor.   
Borrower Size and Loan Market Competition 
Borrower size also may affect the degree of competition faced by banks that 
consider lending to the borrower. A small borrower will be able to consider lending 
offers from many small banks located close to the borrower. But large borrowers, even if 
their operations are geographically concentrated in one place, will not be able to borrow   7 
from small banks because banks require diversified portfolios. Loan-to-one-borrower 
regulatory limits require that banks limit their loans to any one borrower to a small 
fraction of their existing book equity. Even without those regulatory limits, banks would 
voluntarily self-regulate to limit their risk exposures to particular borrowers or industries.  
In New England during our period of study, Fleet and BankBoston were the only 
two large bank lenders, but there were many small banks in existence. When Fleet and 
BankBoston consolidated, competition for small borrowers remained in place because 
small banks continued to provide that competition. But after their consolidation, large 
borrowers had to either borrow from Fleet-BankBoston or turn to lenders from outside 
New England (and those lenders faced a cost disadvantage due to their distant location). 
Summary 
When these three considerations are combined, they have the following 
implications for our study of the cost of making loans to banks, and the pricing of loans 
to bank borrowers:  
 
(1) Loans to the smallest middle-market borrowers will have lower information costs to 
local lenders, and those information costs will be passed on to borrowers, both before and 
after the merger of Fleet-BankBoston, because of the continuing competitiveness of the 
loan market for those loans. That is, there is a sufficient supply of local lenders to offer 
economical loans to small borrowers, both before and after the merger. 
 
(2) The combined effect of information cost and economies of scope on loan pricing prior 
to the merger of Fleet-BankBoston should be to produce a U-shaped relationship between   8 
loan interest rates and borrower size for Fleet-BankBoston borrowers.  In the middling 
size range, where costs are lowest, borrowers are small enough to be geographically 
concentrated in New England but large enough to produce significant economies of scope 
for lenders. Pre-merger competition between Fleet and BankBoston would ensure that at 
least some of the cost economies of lending to this middling size group of borrowers 
would be passed on to borrowers. At some sufficiently large borrower size level, the 
marginal effect of economies of scope diminishes (i.e., at some size threshold, firms are 
large enough to demand a full range of products), and the marginal effect of the 
diseconomy of size related to information costs dominates the marginal effect of 
economies of scope in the cost function.  
 
(3) After the merger of Fleet-BankBoston, the U-shaped relationship should  become 
more of a monotonically increasing relationship. Smaller borrowers continue to enjoy the 
same competition in the local market (due to the continuing existence of small banks), 
but after the merger, larger borrowers have no alternative local source of funds to the 
newly combined Fleet-BankBoston. Consequently, cost savings enjoyed by the new 
Fleet-BankBoston will not be passed on to those borrowers. 
 
These predicted pre- and post-merger patterns are illustrated in Figure II. Note 
that after the merger, there is a jump in the pricing function for loans, which raises the 
cost of loans for medium-sized middle-market borrowers, but not for small- or large-
sized middle-market borrowers. In Figure II, the pricing function jumps at a point 
determined by the maximum loan-to-one-borrower limit of the remaining small banks   9 
(assuming a correspondence between loan size and a borrower’s total annual sales). For 
example, if after the merger the largest of the remaining small banks can only compete 
for loans to firms with under $25 million in sales, then the jump in the pricing function 
will occur at that level of borrower sales. 
 
3.  Data Sources and Research Methods 
  The loan pricing data are constructed from the DealScan database for U.S. 
borrowers from two periods. The pre-merger period is from 07/01/1996 to 06/30/1999 
and the post-merger period is from 01/01/2000 to 12/31/2002. The six month window of 
three months before and after the merger (September 1999) is excluded from the sample 
to allow sufficient time for merger integration to take place. We focus on middle market 
borrowers, defined as borrowers with annual sales between $10 million and $500 million. 
Loan observations, including all-in-spread data, are then matched with Compustat or SEC 
filings for financial statement information.  
The final pre-merger sample consists of 183 and 2,447 loan facilities to firms 
headquartered inside and outside of the New England states, respectively.
5 The final post-
merger sample consists of 147 New England borrowers’ loan facilities and 1,771 non-
New England borrowers’ loan facilities. All loans are assigned to a bank. For syndicated 
loans, the lead lender is identified using the method defined by DealScan, i.e., the top-left 
name in the loan documentation
6.  
                                                 
5 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, and VT. 
6 By DealScan convention, names listed on the top line are those at agent level such as administrative, 
documentation and syndication agents. The first name of the top line is typically the lead arranger with 
pricing power for the loan.   10 
Table II provides descriptive statistics for loans in our sample, both inside and 
outside of New England, before and after the merger. Table III breaks down the market 
share of middle-market lending into three sub-categories according to borrower sales 
size: the small-sized segment of the middle market ($10-$100 million), the medium-sized 
segment of the middle market ($100-$250 million), and the large-sized segment of the 
middle market ($250-$500 million).  
For the medium- and large-sized segments of New England middle-market 
borrowers, the combined market share of Fleet and BankBoston increased from around 
40% before the merger to 52% and 66% after the merger respectively, although the 
amount of their lending to the medium-sized category actually fell substantially. Their 
market share for the small-sized segment of New England middle-market borrowers 
decreased from 22% to 10% after the merger. The significant amount of branch 
divestitures required by regulators may have had a negative impact on the market share of 
Fleet-BankBoston in the small-sized segment of the market.  
It is interesting to note the growth in the middle-market lending market share of 
Fleet-BankBoston outside of New England after the merger. Their overall market share 
roughly doubled from 8% to 15% after the merger. Thus, the merger seems to have 
encouraged them to expand outside of New England. Interestingly, that expansion largely 
reflects growth in lending to the largest middle-market borrowers. It may be that the 
expanded size of the combined Fleet-BankBoston entity allowed it to lower its cost of 
supplying larger loans (a large loan from the combined entity, after the merger, posed less 
of a problem for bank diversification than a comparable loan from either bank before the 
merger).   11 
Table IV provides summary statistics for the all-in-spread on all loans broken 
down by size categories, inside and outside of New England, before and after the merger. 
In New England, Fleet and BankBoston charged 37 and 43 basis points less than their 
competitors, before and after the merger, respectively.
7 Outside of New England, loan 
spreads on Fleet-BankBoston loans were not significantly lower than average before the 
merger but were 18 basis points lower than competitors after the merger.
8 Of course, 
simply looking at the average of all-in-spreads without controlling for the risk 
characteristics of borrowers or differences in cost associated with different types of loans, 
and without distinguishing among borrowers of different size, may provide a misleading 
picture of changes in loan pricing as a result of the merger. Indeed, we will show below 
that one can detect important changes in pricing policies for some classes of borrowers, 
once one takes account of changing characteristics in the sample of borrowers and loans. 
Simple regressions 
  We estimate OLS regression equations predicting the all-in-spreads for loans as a 
function of loan and borrower risk characteristics. Specifically, we consider the following 
regression, run separately for loans made to borrowers inside and outside New England. 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   (1) 
where, 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  -  creates a vector of proper interaction terms of its elements
9,  
￿ ￿ ￿    -  is one if BankBoston or Fleet is the lead lender,   
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  -  is one if the observation is from the post-merger period, 
                                                 
7 Significant at the 1% level. 
8 Significant at the 1% level. 
9 Specifically, we run the regression with 
, * , * , * , * * , * * BBF BBF SMALL BBF MEDIUM POST BBF POST BBF SMALL POST BBF MEDIUM .   12 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  -  is one if  the borrower’s sales are between $10 and $100 million, 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  -  is one if  the borrower’s sales are between $100 and $250 million,  
and  
￿￿￿ ￿ contains control variables. We include loan characteristics such as loan size, 
loan maturity, indicator variables for loan type (revolver, short-term revolver,
10 and term 
loans), indicator variables for the purpose of the loan (e.g., working capital, repayment of 
existing debt, or acquisition finance), an indicator variable for a secured loan, an indicator 
variable for loans made by sole lenders, and an indicator variable for loans that are 
indexed by prime rate instead of Libor.
 11 For characteristics of the borrower, we include 
the equity-to-assets ratio (inverse leverage ratio), sales as measure of borrower size, 
indicator variables for market credit ratings, and indicator variables for industry and time. 
The majority of the borrowers in our dataset (95%) do not have senior debt credit ratings 
by any major rating agencies. To ensure that we adequately capture and control for the 
credit risk of borrowers, we include actual credit ratings (when available) and estimated 
credit ratings for non-rated firms as additional control variables in our regressions. To 
arrive at estimated credit ratings, we run an ordered Probit regression on loan 
observations with available ratings as shown in Table V and then use the estimated 
equation to forecast credit ratings for the whole sample.
 12  
  We also run a regression combining all loans inside and outside of New England, 
rather than separating the two samples, and in that specification we include an additional 
variable, ￿ ￿, as an indicator for loans to borrowers in New England.  
                                                 
10 Due to difference in regulatory capital requirements between revolve loans with less than one year 
maturity and loans with more than one year to maturity, separate dummy variables are used to capture the 
loan pricing difference. 
11 Beim 1996 documents a pricing premium paid by borrowers whose loan spreads are quoted against prime 
rate over borrowers whose loan spreads are quoted against Libor.  
12 In fact, our results are not sensitive to the omission of the credit rating dummies.    13 
  In all of these regressions, the coefficients of ￿ ￿ ￿and its interaction terms with 
borrower size can be used to gauge the impact of the merger on borrowers in different 
size classes. 
Two-step Estimators 
Additionally, we estimate a two-step model of loan interest spreads, to control for 
the potential endogeneity of a borrower’s having a relationship with Fleet-BankBoston, 
where we allow the BBF indicator to be endogenous. If BBF is endogenous to borrower 
characteristics, then that endogeneity could produce selectivity bias and affect our 
estimates of the effects of BBF on interest cost.  
We model 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿as an outcome of an unobserved latent variable:  
 
￿




￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  (3) 
where 
￿ ￿ is a vector of  exogenous  variables,  including 
￿￿￿ ￿ . That is, the matching of 
borrowers to Fleet and BankBoston is not random and the factors that determine the 
matching potentially influence the all-in-spread, as well. As the middle-market borrowers 
are potentially spatially constrained, we include three exogenous distance variables, 
namely￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿into the first-step Probit 
regression.  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ measures the mileage distance between the borrower’s 
headquarters and the Fleet or BankBoston corporate headquarters in Boston. 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿is simply the map coordinate of the borrower’s   14 
headquarter. In the second-step regression, appropriate hazard terms must be added to (1) 
and standard errors  must be adjusted.
13 
                                                 
13  Our  framework  produces  the  same  estimation  result  as  a  switching  regression  with  an  endogenous 
selection equation. Under that framework, one assumes there are two underlying loan rate equations, one 
by  BBF and  the  other  by  their  competitors.  The  borrowers  select  one  of  the  lenders  based  on  an 
endogenous selection equation. Specifically, the problem can be expressed as follows:  
(BBF offer rate equation) 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿     (i) 
(Other offer rate equation) 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   (ii) 
(Selection equation)            
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿    (iii) 
(Observed rate)                   ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿




￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿




   
where 
￿￿ ￿  is a vector containing exogenous variables that determine spread and 
￿￿ ￿ is a vector containing 
exogenous variables that determine a firm’s likelihood of borrowing from BankBoston and Fleet.  Inserting 
(i) and (ii) into (iii), we can rewrite (iii) in reduced form as 
 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿    
where 
￿ ￿ contains all exogenous variables in (i) and (ii). To apply the two-step estimation procedure, 
consider the following expressions for conditional expectations of 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  given 
￿￿ ￿  
and 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿    
               
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿    
where we define 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  so that the null hypothesis of interest can be written as 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
Assume joint normality of error terms, which is not required for consistency of two-step estimators, to 
write out hazard terms explicitly. We have     
 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿    
    
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿    
where 
￿￿ ￿ is  the  covariance  between 
￿
￿ ￿   and 
￿ ￿ ,  ￿￿ ￿ is  the  covariance  between 
￿
￿ ￿   and 
￿ ￿ ,  and  ￿ ￿ is 
standard deviation of 
￿ ￿ .  The function  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ is the inverse Mills ratio and  ￿ ￿  is the probit ML estimate of ￿  
from the first stage regression. The second stage regression can be implemented on all observations in the 
following OLS regression: 
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   
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However, the standard errors from the second-step regression are incorrect and need to be adjusted for the 
variation  introduced  by  ￿ ￿   in  the  first  stage  Probit  regression.  The  standard  error  adjustment  for  this 
problem is essentially that of the generated regressors framework that is treated extensively in the literature 
(see, for example, Wooldridge 2001 Chapter 6 and Heckman 1979).       
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Matched-sample Analysis 
  As a robustness test to our regression results, we calculate matching estimators to 
measure the difference between the average all-in-spread of BBF loans and average all-
in-spread of non-BBF loans. In our context, we assume that a loan can be grouped into 
two groups indexed by theBBF variable. Conceptually, each loan i in our sample has a 
b
i SPREAD  that would result if the loan were made by BBF and a 
o
i SPREAD  that would 
result if the loan were made by other, non-BBF lenders. The quantity of interest is the 
mean effect of treatment on the treated as commonly used in the program evaluation 
literature: 
  E( | , =1)
b o
i i i i SPREAD SPREAD X BBF -   (4) 
where  i X  contains all variables that explain the relevant difference between BBF and 
non-BBF loans. Since the quantity E( | , =1)
o
i i i SPREAD X BBF  is unobservable, we can at 
best use its observable counterpart from self-selected non-BBF loans  
￿ E( | , =0)
o
i i i SPREAD X BBF ￿ ￿￿￿￿
for our comparison.  
As described in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997 and  Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd 1998, the bias introduced by using  
￿ E( | , =1)   E( | , =0)
b o
i i i i i i SPREAD X BBF SPREAD X BBF - ￿ ￿￿￿￿
instead of (4) to estimate the mean effect of treatment on the treated can be minimized by 
matching each BBF loan to a subset of non-BBF loans whose propensity scores are 
closest to the score of that particular BBF loan. In our case, we can simply use the Probit   16 
regression in the first-step regression of our two-step estimators in the previous section to 
construct a propensity score Pr( 1| ) i i BBF X =  for all loans in our sample. We consider 




4. Empirical Results 
Table VI presents our main regression results, where New England and the rest of 
the country are treated separately. The first two columns are the OLS and two-step 
estimators for the all-in-spread in New England (where the two-step regression uses a 
first-stage regression that only includes New England borrowers), whereas the last two 
columns are the corresponding results for loans outside New England (where the two-step 
regression uses a first-stage regression that only includes borrowers outside New 
England). The control variables play an important role. The equity to total asset ratio, EA, 
enters the regressions significantly with the expected negative sign. The size of the 
borrowers, LOGSALES, is also significant and has a negative sign. The variable 
SECURED is also significantly positive, reflecting the fact that unobservably riskier loans 
have a greater chance of being secured. Consistent with Beim 1996, we also document a 
                                                 
14 Let 
b
i SPREAD  be the spread of BBF loan i. Then, the nearest neighbor matching estimator with 
parameter N constructs the average spread of N non-BBF loans with the closest propensity score as 
(1/ ) ; 1,...,
o
o
i j j SPREAD N SPREAD j N = = ￿ . The Gaussian kernel matching estimator uses a weighted 
average of spread of all non-BBF loans by assigning higher weight to loans with closer propensity score to 
BBF loan i. Specifically, for each non-BBF loan j, the weigh assigned to its spread is 
, ( )
b o
i j i j w propensityscore propensityscore f = - , where f is normal density. Then, the weighted 
average spread of non-BBF loans is  , , ( )/
o
o
i j j i j i j j SPREAD w SPREAD w = ´ ￿ ￿ . Finally, (6) can be 
estimated by  ( )
b o
i i i SPREAD SPREAD - ￿ .   17 
large and significantly positive coefficient for PRIME, an indicator variable for loans that 
are quoted relative to prime rate (instead of Libor).  
In the OLS regression, we find that, before the merger, loans by Fleet and 
BankBoston to the small-sized segment of the middle market are priced on average 50 
basis points (-67 + 17) lower than their competitors for otherwise identical loans to New 
England borrowers. The pre-merger discount for the middle-sized segment of New 
England’s middle-market lending is even greater, averaging 82 basis points (-99 + 17). 
There is no discount for the large-sized segment of the middle market. Thus, our 
empirical results confirm the predicted pre-merger U-Shaped relationship between loan 
pricing and borrower size for New England borrowers of Fleet and BankBoston. Outside 
of New England, we find no discount for any category of middle-market borrowers 
before the merger.  
This evidence is consistent with the view that Fleet and BankBoston enjoyed 
special economies of scale and scope in middle-market lending within New England, 
which allowed them to underprice other competitors. Competition between them, as the 
two largest lenders in the region, effectively forced them to pass on their efficiency 
advantages to borrowers.  These efficiency advantages did not extend beyond their own 
regional market, as is shown by the results for loans outside of New England.   
After the merger, the discount for the small-sized segment of middle-market 
borrowers increases slightly (but not statistically significantly) to 84 basis points (-67 + 
17 – 18 – 16). For the medium-sized segment, however, the pre-merger discount 
disappears. This result demonstrates the post-merger exercise of market power within 
New England, and shows that it only occurs within the middle-sized category of middle-  18 
market borrowers. The market for loans to small-sized borrowers is still competitive (as it 
contains many small banks especially as a result of asset divestiture), and the loan market 
for large-sized borrowers is as competitive as it used to be before the merger because 
those borrowers have access to national capital markets and to large banks in other 
regions.  
The results from two-step regressions are similar to the OLS results. In fact, the 
coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio in the second-step regression for New England loans 
is not significant, rejecting the presence of endogeneity bias from BBF. Even though the 
coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio for loans from outside of New England is highly 
significant, the only noticeable difference between two-step and OLS regression is that 
the coefficient of the BBF variable becomes positively significant (28 basis points), 
which affects loan spreads of middle-market borrowers of all sizes. Table VIII shows the 
first-step Probit regression where we include the log of distance (in miles) between the 
borrower and Boston, LDIST, and its square term together with the latitude and longitude 
of the borrowers’ headquarters.
15 Our choice of these instruments reflects our assumption 
that middle-market borrowers are spatially constrained and select their lenders partially 
based on their location.  
  In addition, we run OLS and two-step regressions combining all loans from inside 
and outside of New England, together with an indicator variable for loans from borrowers 
within New England, NE. The results are similar and are reported in Table VII. To test 
whether our results are sensitive to our choice of the size cut-offs for the small, middle 
                                                 
15 Using the range of distance between Fleet-BankBoston headquarter and borrowers within the U.S. in the 
sample, the net marginal effect of distance on Pr(BBF=1) estimates is negative both inside and outside of 
New England. The variables Latitude and Longitude are significant for regressions of loans outside of New 
England and combined loan observations, but their economic significance is very small.     19 
and large segments of middle-market borrowers, we replaced discrete indicator variables 
for the size of borrowers, which interact with BBF, with the continuous measures, 
LOGSALES and LOGSALES squared. The results are qualitatively similar and are not 
reported here. 
  As a robustness test, we also apply the econometric matching methods of 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997 and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1998 to our data, 
as described above. The results are shown in Table IX for the Gaussian kernel estimator. 
The results are very similar for nearest neighbors (with N=1), and thus are not reported 
here. Within small-sized and medium-sized segments of New England borrowers before 
the merger, non-BBF loans are priced on average 56 and 94 basis points higher than the 
corresponding BBF loans respectively. After the merger, the BBF discount increases to 
89 basis points for the small-sized borrowers but disappears for the medium-sized 
segment of the market. Consistent with the regression results, there is no discount in loan 
pricing for the large-sized segment of middle-market borrowers before or after the 
merger, nor is there a discount for non-New England loans.    
 
5. Conclusions 
Our findings that Fleet and BankBoston offered pre-merger interest rate discounts 
to medium-sized borrowers in middle market lending in New England, and that the 
discount disappeared after the merger, indicate several important points. First, large 
universal banks seem to enjoy location-specific economies with small- and medium-sized 
middle-market borrowers.    20 
Second, the pre-merger pricing for middle-market borrowers indicates that the 
banking market can be very “competitive,” even when it is highly concentrated. Fleet and 
BankBoston competed away nearly a full percentage point of their cost advantages in the 
medium-sized segment of the middle-market loan market prior to the merger, even 
though they were the only two large banks in New England. That result is consistent with 
Cetorelli’s (2002) finding for deposit market competition. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) 
show that, in theory, the extent to which oligopolistic competition results in lower pricing 
depends on the costs of generating both capacity and production. The Bertrand 
equilibrium in which price competition between duopolists results in the perfectly 
competitive outcome depends on the ability of the duopolists to produce whatever is 
demanded. That assumption requires firms to be able to increase capacity rapidly at no 
cost. In banking, lending capacity is dictated by the availability of equity capital and 
human capital (lending officers). Given the ability to shift both equity capital and human 
capital across different lending niches (defined by sizes and locations of borrowers) it is 
reasonable to view capacity in any one lending niche as relatively easy to expand. In such 
a circumstance, it is not surprising that competition between two banks would produce 
significant cost savings for affected borrowers relative to monopolistic pricing.  
Third, once Fleet and BankBoston merged, the economies of information and 
product scope that large universal banks can realize no longer accrued to borrowers, and 
instead became captured by the consolidated entity.  
Fourth, competition for smaller firms’ loans was not affected by the merger. After 
the merger, the combined entity controlled about half of the loans made to middle-market 
lenders in New England. Discounts on middle-sized middle-market loans in New   21 
England disappeared after the merger, but not on small loans, indicating that competition 
remained strong for small borrowers (who could borrow from small banks as well as 
large ones), but that middle-sized middle-market borrowers in New England had limited 
alternatives to the combined Fleet-BankBoston entity after the merger since they are 
spatially constrained.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, many advocates of the elimination of branching 
restrictions envisioned a new banking structure for the United States consisting of a 
competitive, nationwide branching system, dominated by many universal banks. While 
some regions have seen an increase in competition resulting from branching, others have 
not.  In some regions, given the initial conditions of bank fragmentation, and the barriers 
to entry into new regions posed by an absence of a preexisting set of customer 
relationships, consolidation has resulted in reduced competition in some regional loan 
markets, with New England being an extreme case. 
Our results suggest that the Fed could expand its anticompetitive study of merger 
proposals to consider the lending side of the banking business, and could look at 
particular niches within the lending market when examining anti-competitive effects of a 
merger. At a minimum, the equivalent version of a Herfindahl-Hirschman index for 
deposit markets could be calculated for middle-market loans in the areas in which the 
merger candidates are operating. The availability of loan data, such as those used in this 
paper, makes it possible to perform such an analysis.
16  
                                                 
16 The analysis of loan pricing using the DealScan database in this study requires a substantial amount of 
manual matching of loan observations to other data sources due to the lack of variables that link loan 
pricing data to lender and borrower financial information. We suggest a few additions to the data fields 
available in LPC DealScan database that will make such linking more accurate and automated, and thus 
will make regulatory use of such data more viable. First, FDIC CERT ID or Federal Reserve RSSD ID of 
the lenders in the loan should be collected at the time of loan filing with DealScan. These variables enable 
us to link DealScan data to bank financial data, holding structure, and merger information at the FDIC or   22 
Divestiture requirements could take into account the need to support a 
competitive lending market for middle-market borrowers. Doing so may require not only 
that the merging institutions divest some branches, but that they also divest a significant 
number of middle-market lending relationships so that the divested assets and capabilities 
of the merging institutions be sufficient in size and scope to ensure that a large entrant 
would be interested in bidding on them.  In the Fleet-BankBoston merger, this was not 
done. Instead, branches were spun off to small banks to ensure sufficient fragmentation 
of the deposit market. 
Achieving a change in merger approval and divestiture policy may require more 
than regression evidence.  Merger policy is also affected by political pressures brought to 
bear on regulators by banks and politicians. The failure to attract a large entrant as a 
purchaser of divested assets was not the result of the failure to anticipate the effects of the 
merger.  One of the authors of this study (Calomiris 1999) acted as a consultant to the 
governments of Massachusetts and Connecticut prior to the Fleet-BankBoston merger. 
Based on regression analysis of only the pre-merger sample of middle-market borrowers 
in New England, he advised regulators, in an opinion filed on July 20, 1999, that: 
The highest risk of costs to the public from this merger comes from the potential 
destruction of competition for middle market relationships. In these areas competition 
favors large banks because of economies of scale and scope. It is crucial, therefore, that a 
viable competitor of substantial size and technical capability be able to credibly bid for, 
and continue, a competitive large-scale bank (in particular, one with middle market 
lending capability) alongside the new merged entity….. 
 
…the Federal Reserve Board’s approach to measuring market concentration – which 
focuses on local deposit concentration – is fundamentally flawed and especially 
inadequate for measuring the potential effects on competition in particular bank niches 
(e.g., middle-market lending)…. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Federal Reserve System. Second, when possible, DealScan should identify a unique identification number 
of the borrower (such as Compustat GVKEY or CRSP PERMNO) that can be linked to the borrower’s 
financial data.     23 
 
The regressions indicate that Fleet and BankBoston currently possess significant cost 
advantages, which translate into more than a full percentage point relative to their 
competitors….in the absence of continuing competition by at least  two such banks in the 
New England area, those cost advantages would not be passed on in the same way to 
bank customers, since competitive pressures would be lacking.  If the two banks could 
combine, and if no new entrant with similar scale, scope, and geographic presence were 
to enter, significantly higher interest costs would result.  
 
  Despite that evidence, and despite much opposition from middle-market 
borrowers in New England at the time, who feared that they would suffer higher rates 
from the merger and voiced that fear to the authorities, there was little chance of stopping 
Fleet and BankBoston from merging, or of forcing them to divest a large chunk of their 
middle-market business. According to some sources, Fleet, BankBoston, and some of the 
smaller banks that anticipated gains from being able to acquire some divested branches 
enlisted the help of influential members of Congress to pressure the Justice Department 
and the Fed to ignore arguments made by experts, middle-market borrowers, and state 
government officials that divestiture should be handled differently.   
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Figure II
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